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INTRODUCTION

In connection with crimes in general, the separation of powers
doctrine creates a natural tension between the General Assembly
and the courts. Under the police power,1 the General Assembly has

1. Under the United States Constitution, the powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to the States or to the people. U.S. CONST. amend.
X. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the General Assembly's police power in
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 636-37 (Pa. 1954). "State legislatures and local
governments have a police power to enact laws for the benefit of public safety, health, welfare, and even morality. But those laws are subject to judicial review as to whether the legislation is reasonably related to those purposes." Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The
Evolving Police Power: Some Observationsfor a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511,
528 (1999-2000). For an excellent general discussion of the police power as well as its applicability to local government, see What Is The "PolicePower"?, PA. LEGISLATOR'S MUN.
DESKBOOK 87-88 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/deskbook06/IssuesHealthWelfare-andSafety_01_PolicePower.pdf.
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the power 2 to make substantive criminal laws that proscribe conduct from minor offenses to murder 3 and to set the penalties 4 for
their violation. 5 In contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
through its rulemaking authority, has the power to create the procedure that the courts will follow during prosecutions for violations
7
of criminal laws.6 The courts also have the power to enter orders
that impose sentence. 8 The tension that arises from the legislative
power to create substantive crimes and the judicial power to create

2. ''Power ...means the ability of a decision-making body to order or effect a certain
result."' Riedel v. Human Relations Comm'n of City of Reading, 739 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. 1999)
(citing Del. River Port Auth. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 182 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. 1962)). Judges
and lawyers often confuse "power" and "jurisdiction," as the terms are not interchangeable.
Id. ''Jurisdiction relates solely to the competency of the particular court or administrative
body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its
consideration belongs."' Id. Power or jurisdiction may confer "authority" to act. Cf.BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 152 (9th ed. 2009) ("supervisory authority").
3. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-9352 (West 2000) (the "Crimes Code"); see also
id. § 107(a) (providing that preliminary provision of Title 18 are applicable to offenses defined
by Title 18 or any other statute).
4. See id. § 1102 (penalties for murder); id. § 1103 (felony offenses); id. § 1104 (misdemeanor offenses); id. § 1105 (summary offenses); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 97019799.41 (West 2014) (the "Sentencing Code").
5. There is no specific provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution that confers upon the
General Assembly the power to establish crimes and penalties. "The General Assembly is
treated by the Pennsylvania courts as a body of general legislative powers except where there
are express or implied constitutional limits." Bruce Ledewitz, Summary of Pennsylvania
(PA) Constitutional Law, http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/summary-of-pa-constitutional-law--by-bruce-ledewitz/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). "It
is... settled 'that the legislature has the exclusive power to pronounce which acts are crimes,
to define crimes, and to fix the punishment for all crimes. The legislature also has the sole
power to classify crimes ....
"' Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1283 (Pa. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Church, 522 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa. 1987)). It should be noted, however,
that in cases prior to the adoption of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution, the courts recognized the power of the General Assembly to establish criminal procedure in addition to making substantive criminal laws and fixing penalties. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cano, 133
A.2d 800, 805 (Pa.), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 182 (1957); Van Swartow v.
Commonwealth, 24 Pa. 131, 134 (1854) ("There is nothing to forbid the legislature from creating a new offence and prescribing what mode they please of ascertaining the guilt of those
who are charged with it.").
6. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
7. The jurisdiction of a court to enter and enforce an order derives from a legislative
statute within the Judicial Code:
Every court shall have power to issue, under its judicial seal, every lawful writ and
process necessary or suitable for the exercise of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement
of any order which it may make and all legal and equitable powers required for or
incidental to the exercise of its jurisdiction, and, except as otherwise prescribed by
general rules, every court shall have power to make such rules and orders of court as
the interest of justice or the business of the court may require.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 323 (West 2004).
8. A court's power to impose sentence is conferred by the Sentencing Code. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9703. The power was also conferred by section 9751 (Sentencing Judge), but
the Supreme Court subsequently suspended section 9751 as being inconsistent with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 700 (Sentencing Judge). See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1101(6).
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related procedural law is exacerbated when contempt is in play because criminal contempt is a crime, 9 yet one that would exist even
if the legislature never entered the field, as the power to define and
punish contempt is inherent in the courts. Thus, contempt statutes
reduce the power of the courts while any overly restrictive contempt
statute has the potential to render the courts powerless. 10 The overarching constitutional issue is the authority of the General Assembly to legislate substantive and procedural contempt provisions.
For almost two hundred years, the Pennsylvania courts tolerated
legislative incursions into their inherent contempt power.1
Whether by indifference to separation of powers or by design, Pennsylvania's lower appellate courts even embraced certain aspects of
the General Assembly's statutory sentencing scheme as applying to
judges when sentencing defendants convicted of criminal contempt.1 2 Then, by chance-in a case in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court sua sponte raised an issue of constitutional dimension-the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.
McMullen,1 3 was constrained to address the constitutionality of a
criminal contempt statute that defined one form of contempt and
fixed the maximum penalty for violation of it. A decisive majority
held that the General Assembly could not legislate the crime of contempt,1 4 limit the power of a court to punish for contempt, 15 or create a right to a jury trial,16 which would give twelve citizens the
power to nullify a judge's authority to take action that the judge
deems reasonably necessary for the efficient administration of justice.
Part I of this article begins with a definition of contempt, followed, in Part II, by a synopsis of the types, origin, underpinnings,
and nature of a court's contempt power. Against this backdrop,
which is essential to understanding Pennsylvania contempt law
pre- and post-McMullen, Part II presents the historical development of contempt from a chronological perspective, highlighting the

9. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. Moran, 560 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1989); Matter of Johnson,
359 A.2d 739, 742 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453, 454 (Pa. 1857) ("substantive criminal offense"); In re Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 19 (1855); Diamond v. Diamond,
715 A.2d 1190, 1195 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979); Borough of Beaver v. Steckman, 728 A.2d 418, 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
10. See Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. at 18.
11. See infra Part II; Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. 1996) (citing to section 4131
in Title 42, which was amended and renumbered in 1982 to section 4132).
12.

See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.

13.

961 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2008).

14.

Id. at 850.

15. Id.
16.

Id. at 848.
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separation of power issues and constitutional clash between the
General Assembly and the courts. Part III discusses and analyzes
the McMullen Court's multiple opinions. Finally, in Parts IV and
V, this article surveys the current state of the law of contempt postMcMullen and offers an opinion about the constitutionality of the
remaining contempt statutes.
I.

A.

CONTEMPT BACKGROUND

Definition of and DistinctionBetween Civil and Criminal
Contempt

Substantively, contempt is a broad concept that can cover a multitude of conduct; the definition of contempt can be complicated and
the outer contours of contemptuous behavior can be difficult to discern. 17 Contempt of court has been described as "the Proteus of the
Legal World, assuming an almost infinite diversity of forms."1 8 A
simple definition of contempt is "an affront to legal authority . .."9
In general 20 and under Pennsylvania law, 21 contempt encompasses
two separate and distinct concepts: (1) violation of an official order;
or (2) interruption or interference with an official proceeding.
Contempt is either civil or criminal, although the same facts or
conduct may constitute both.22 Although the dividing line between
17. Ronald Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44, 44
(1961-1962) [hereinafter Varieties]. See generally Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (1961).
18. Varieties, supra note 17, at 44 n.1 (citing Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions,
Civil and Criminal,43 COLUM. L. REV. 780 (1943)). In 1792, Lord Hardwicke divided contempt into three categories:
There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt is, scandalizing the
court itself. There may be a contempt of this court, in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here. There may be also a contempt of this court, in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard.
Id. at 44 (citing St. James Evening Post Case, 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 684 (Ch. 1742)).
19. Cnty. Election Bd. of Phila. v. Rader, 58 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948).
20. See Edward M. Dangel, Contempt § 1, at 2 (1939):
Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language, in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair
the respect due to such a body.
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 323 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)
("The basis for contempt is to provide punishment for contemptuous disregard of a court's
authority."); see Slater v. Rimar Inc., 338 A.2d 584, 589 & n.ll (Pa. 1975) (explaining that a
trial judge has inherent supervisory power to control litigation over which he is presiding,
which is distinct from the inherent contempt power, and stating that "[g]enerally speaking,
one is guilty of contempt when his contact tends to bring the authority and administration of
the law into disrespect.") (citation omitted); Commonwealth ex rel. Litz v. Litz, 154 A.2d 420,
422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959); Commonwealth v. Peters, 113 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955).
22. Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 486 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (citing Brocker v. Brocker,
241 A.2d 336, 339-40 (Pa. 1968)).
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civil and criminal contempt has been described as "sometimes shadowy or obscure," 23 the distinction depends upon the purpose sought
24
by the court in its use.

Generally, a sentence of civil contempt will be imposed "to prospectively coerce the contemnor to comply with an order of the
court.

' 25

In the case of civil contempt, the contemnor has "the key

to the jail house" and may be released by the court as soon as the
contemnor complies with the order. 26 The court may advance a
party's private interests by imposing remedial punishment, such as
a fine payable to the aggrieved party, as compensation for actual
loss. 27
In contrast, a court uses criminal contempt to maintain order in
the courtroom, vindicate the court's authority, and protect the interests of the public.

28

In terms of judicial use, a judge uses civil

contempt to compel a party to comply with specific rules or orders
and uses criminal contempt to punish a contemnor's completed act
29
for which there is no reversal.
B.

Direct Versus Indirect Criminal Contempt

Criminal contempt can be characterized as one of two types: direct or indirect. 30 Direct criminal contempt "consists of misconduct

23. Id.
24. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 881 A.2d 841, 845 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
25. In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22, 28 (Pa. 1975); see also McMullen, 881 A.2d at 846
("Civil contempt is ... an available remedy for obstruction in the presence of the court and
may be used to compel obedience by imposing fine or imprisonment conditioned on obedience
to the court's order.").
26. McMullen, 881 A.2d at 846.
27. Stahl, 897 A.2d at 486-87.
28. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (stating that the
sentence for criminal contempt is punitive and is used to vindicate the authority of the court);
Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 762 (Pa. 1980) (citing United States v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947)) ("Criminal contempts ... have as a
dominant purpose the vindication of the dignity and authority of the court and to protect the
interests of the general public."); In re Aungst, 192 A.2d 723, 725 (Pa. 1963) ("[T]he
court . . . should be the primary protector of its judicial dignity and conscience . . . and is,

therefore, empowered to protect itself from insult."); Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 81 A.2d 316,
318 (Pa. 1951) (quoting In re Myers & Brei, 83 Pa. Super. 383, 387-88 (1924)) ("Courts undoubtedly have the power to punish contempts and necessarily must have it to protect themselves from insult and enforce obedience to their process."'); In re Petition of Start, 142 A.2d
449, 452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) ("The power of a court to punish for contempt is essential to
the administration of justice; it enables the court to protect itself from insult and to enforce
obedience to its process.").
29. McMullen, 881 A.2d at 845.
30. Knaus v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669, 671 (Pa. 1956).
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of a person in the presence of the court, or so near thereto to interfere with its immediate business ....,31 Indirect criminal contempt
"consists of the violation of an order or decree of a court which occurs outside the presence of the court. ' 32 Each has its own distinct
procedures and confers distinct procedural rights.3 3 A contemnor
charged with indirect criminal contempt will be afforded the traditional or usual procedural safeguards required to convict him of the
36
35
crime, 34 which includes notice of the order, notice of the hearing,
37
and an opportunity to be heard.
A judge may adjudicate and punish direct contempt summarily,
which means that the court acts instantly to suppress and punish
the misconduct.3 8 The judge ignores the traditional steps involved
in an adjudication, such as the issuance and service of process, conducting an evidentiary hearing, receiving briefs, and any other procedural steps and substantive rights attendant to a conventional
court trial.3 9 Adherence to the panoply of procedural protections is
deemed unnecessary because the judge is a witness 40 to the contemptuous conduct. 4 1 Summary punishment allows the judge immediately to vindicate his authority in front of those observing the
court proceeding. 42 Unless the contemptuous conduct is apparent,
such as profanity directed at the court, the notice requirement of

31. Id. (citing Act of June 16, 1836 (P.L. 784), §§ 23, 24 (codified as amended at 17 P.S.
§§ 2041, 2042 (1930) (repealed 1976))). The nonappearance of a party, witness, or attorney
who is properly summoned is considered "inthe presence of the court" and a direct criminal
contempt. See Williams v. Williams, 721 A.2d 1072, 1073 (Pa. 1998); Stewart v. Foxworth,
65 A.3d 468, 472 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Himes v. Himes, 833 A.2d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) (citing Williams, 721 A.2d at 1073; Commonwealth v. Odom, 764 A.2d 53, 54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).
32. Id. at 672.
33. Bruzzi v. Bruzzi, 481 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
34. In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22, 29 (Pa. 1975) (citing cases and statute).
35. Commonwealth v. Garrison, 386 A.2d 971, 980 (Pa. 1978); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 532 A.2d 28, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
36. Jackson, 532 A.2d at 32.
37. Id.
38. Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1980) (citing Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925)).
39. Id. (citing Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952)).
40. A judge may find a person in direct criminal contempt even if the judge does not
personally witness the contemptuous conduct because the phrase "inthe presence of the
court" has "not [been] so narrowly interpreted to include only those acts that the judge sees
with his or her own eyes." Commonwealth v. Brown, 622 A.2d 946, 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
41. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. Moran, 560 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. 1989) ("It is summary
because its proofs are evident; the authority and orderly process of the court are directly
confronted upon its open record and the evidence is plain and usually self-accusing.").
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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due process might require the judge to give a warning4 3 or enter an
44
order that is definite and precise.
II.

THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF, AND LEGISLATIVE INCURSION

INTO, THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS' INHERENT CONTEMPT POWER

It is well settled that Pennsylvania courts have the inherent
power to punish individuals for contempt. 45 The contempt power's
exact origin is unknown; however, the power can most accurately
be traced back to very early English common law4 6 but applied only
to courts of record. 47 One court suggested that inferior courts could
exercise contempt power if the legislature granted the power. 48 A

43. Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d 190, 193 n.1 (Pa. 1996).
44. Commonwealth v. Baker, 766 A.2d 328, 332 (Pa. 2001).
45. See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003) ("Courts possess an inherent power to enforce their orders by way of the power of contempt."); Commonwealth v.
Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1980) ("In ...a criminal contempt, the law has long recognized the need to provide the courts with the power to impose summary punishment for such
conduct in appropriate situations."); Commonwealth v. Haefner, 368 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. 1977)
(''The right to punish for ... contempt is inherent in all courts."') (quoting Appeal of Levine,
95 A.2d 222, 225 (Pa. 1953)); Brocker v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1968) ("The Courts
have always possessed the inherent power to enforce their Orders and Decrees by imposing
penalties and sanctions for failure to obey or comply therewith."); In re Williamson's Case,
26 Pa. 9, 18 (1855) ("Does anybody doubt the jurisdiction of the District Court to punish
contempt? Certainly not. All courts have this power, and must necessarily have it ....
Without it, they would be utterly powerless.").
46. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[T]he most authoritative student of the history of contempt of court has impressively shown
that 'from the reign of Edward I it was established that the Court had the power to punish
summarily contempt committed in the actual view of the Court."') (quoting SIR JOHN C. FOX,
THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 49-52 (1927)); see also Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v.
Anthracite Miners of Pa., 174 A. 11, 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934) ("Courts of constitutional origin
have inherent common-law power, independent of statute, to punish for contempt.").
The common law of England, as to crimes, became the law of Pennsylvania except insofar
as it has been abrogated by statute. See Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1955) (citing 15 AM. JUR. Common Law § 4 (1937); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 19
(current version at 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 29 (2006)); cf. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1503
(West 2008) (declaring that common law of England shall be deemed to have been in force
from and after February 10, 1777).
47. See Albright v. Lapp, 26 Pa. 99, 101 (1856) (finding that [the 1836 summary contempt
law] applies only to "the higher courts, which are in every sense courts of record" and not to
justices of the peace); Cnty. Election Bd. of Phila. v. Rader, 58 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1948) (explaining that the power of common pleas courts to punish contempt does not, in the
absence of specific legislation, extend to a board or an officer whose authority is not derived
from a court); Case of Llewellyn, 2 Pa. D. 631, 632 (Ct. Com. P1. Luzerne Cnty. 1893) ("It may
be stated, as a legal principle fully and firmly established, that the power to inflict summary
punishment by imprisonment for contempt, is limited to courts of record ....). But see Fitler
v. Probasco, 2 Browne 137, 143 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Phila. Cnty. 1811) (finding that a justice of
the peace does possess the power to summarily punish for contempt but only when exercised
in his judicialcapacity and not when he is acting ministerially).
48. See Llewellyn, 2 Pa. D. at 632 (citing Albright, 26 Pa. at 101) ("The [General Assembly] intended to define, with all possible precision, the cases in which higher courts might
exercise the power, and to restrain its exercise in all other cases. If they had intended to give
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court's authority to punish for contempt is found in Pennsylvania
appellate jurisprudence beginning in 1788.49 For two decades
thereafter, the courts exercised their contempt power without leg50
islative encroachment .
A.

Judicial Code (Title 42) Statutes
1.

Statutory Limitations and Expansions of the Contempt
Power

The General Assembly's initial incursion into the inherent contempt power appears to have occurred in 1809. That year, the General Assembly enacted a statute 5 1 stating that the power of judges
53
to issue attachments 52 and to impose summary punishments
would be restricted 54 to certain types of contempt:
SECT. I. BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the
same, That from and after the passing of this act, the power of
the judges of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue
attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts
of court shall be restricted to the following cases, that is to say,
To the official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively, to the negligence or disobedience of officers, parties, jurors, or witnesses against the lawful process of the court, to the
misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, obstructing the administration of justice. 55

it to justices of the peace they would have said so."); see also Brooker v. Commonwealth, 12
Serg. & Rawle 175, 176 (Pa. 1824).
49. See Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 326 (Pa. 1788); Mifflin v. Bingham, 1 Dall.
272, 274 (Pa. 1788) (explaining, without citing to statute, that witness was subject to contempt of court by disobeying subpoena process).
50. See Blackburn v. Markle, 12 Serg. & Rawle 143, 144 (Pa. 1824); Blaine's Lessee v.
Chambers, 1 Serg. & Rawle 169, 171 (Pa. 1814); Bayard v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 438, 440 (Pa.
1802); Penn v. Messinger, 1 Yeates 2, 2 (Pa. 1791).
51. Act of Apr. 3, 1809 (5 Sm. L. 55, ch. 3080 (1812)) (An act concerning contempts of
court) (reenacted 1836).

52.

An attachment is "[t]he arrest of a person who either is in contempt of court or is to

be held as security for the payment of a judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed.
2009).
53. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
54. The margin to the text of the published statute contains a summary stating: "Powers
of the courts to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, restricted. To what
cases." Act of Apr. 3, 1809 (5 Sm. L. 55, ch. 3080 (1812)).

55.

Id.
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Importantly, the General Assembly did not create a new substantive criminal offense, which is consistent with Pennsylvania law
that recognizes that contempt statutes are simply declaratory of
common law. 56 Rather, this initial contempt statute imposed a procedural restriction on the exercise of the power of the courts, in that
the statute limits summary punishment to the forms of contempt in
the statute. 57 The courts apparently endorsed the statute as a legitimate exercise of legislative power because pre-McMullen Pennsylvania jurisprudence provided that the manner of a court's exer58
cise of contempt power could be "regulated" by statute.
Furthermore, the language of section I does not limit summary
punishment to misconduct "in the presence of the court." For example, an officer of the court could commit "official misconduct" outside the court's presence. Because the statutory language would
allow judges to punish summarily for contemptuous conduct committed outside the presence of the court, section I's restriction does
not depend upon the distinction between direct and indirect contempt. The direct versus indirect distinction that applies to the cur59
rent test for determining when summary punishment is available
is a due process restriction imposed by the courts and not the result
60
of legislative fiat.
Section III of the Act provided for imprisonment for contempts
committed in open court, with all other contempts to be punished
61
by fine only.
In section IV of the Act, the General Assembly provided that the
courts would have the power to make rules allowing the courts to

56. P.L.E. Contempt § 21, 370-71 (1980) (citing C.J.S. Contempt § 43 (current version at
17 C.J.S. Contempt § 76 (2011))); see also In re Johnson, 359 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. 1976) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) ("The Act of 1836 [successor statute to Act of 1809] serves as a restriction
on the inherent power of the courts to uphold the dignity and authority of their proceedings
through punishments for contempt. . . . The language of the Act does not purport to grant to
courts a new power, but rather acts to restrict the power courts inherently possess ....

").

57. Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453, 456 (Pa. 1857) ("[T]o prevent oppression,
through abuse of the [contempt] power, the legislature have [sic] carefully defined . . . the
cases in which [summary punishment] may be exercised ... ").
58.

P.L.E.2d Contempt § 21, 332 (2009); see Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 393 A.2d 386,

389 (Pa. 1978) ("The power to impose summary punishment for contempt, while inherent in
all courts,... is limited by [statute].") (citations omitted); Appeal of Marks, 20 A.2d 242, 245
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1941) ("The Right to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, but the
manner of its exercise is regulated [by statute].") (citations omitted).
59.
60.

See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.

61.

Act of Apr. 3, 1809 (5 Sm. L. 55, ch. 3080 (1812)) (An act concerning contempts of

court) (reenacted 1836).
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issue attachments to compel sheriffs and coroners to return writs
63
62
and produce a body after a return of cepi corpus to an execution.
In 1836, the General Assembly reenacted the 1809 statute using
almost identical language and used Roman numerals to subdivide
the limiting language into three types of contempt.6 4 Like the 1809
Act, the 1836 Act restricted punishment by imprisonment to contempts committed in open court, with all other contempts punishable by fine only.6 5 In indirect criminal contempt matters, the preMcMullen cases have adhered to the "fine only" restriction.6 6 Another provision in the 1836 Act provided that a court could order
the county sheriff to jail any person fined for contempt until the fine
67
was paid, although the jail term could not exceed three months.
The current version of the 1836 Act was reenacted by the General
Assembly in July 1976 and appears in Title 42 as sections 4132,68

62. Historically, "[c]epi was often used in a capias return by an arresting sheriff, as in
cepi corpus et est in custodia ('I have taken the defendant [or body] and he is in custody')."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (9th ed. 2009).
63. Act of Apr. 3, 1809 (5 Sm. L. 55, ch. 3080 (1812)).
64. 17 P.S. § 2041 (1930) (originally enacted as Act of June 16, 1836 (P.L. 784), § 23)
(repealed 1976):
SECTION 23. The power of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue attachments, and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall be restricted
to the following cases, to wit:
I. To the official misconduct of the officers of such courts, respectively:
II. To disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful
process of the court:
III. To the misbehaviour of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing
the administration of justice.
65. Id. § 2042 (originally enacted as Act of June 16, 1836 (P.L. 784), § 24) (repealed 1976).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deemed "open court" within the meaning of the contempt statute to be a proceeding with "any ceremony." Albright v. Lapp, 26 Pa. 99, 101
(1856).
66. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n Local Union, 140 A.2d 814,
819 (Pa. 1958) (stating that "all other contempts," which is synonymous with indirect criminal contempt, may be punished by fine only); Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453, 457
(Pa. 1857) (holding that a lawyer who was found in contempt for purportedly failing to obey
a witness subpoena could not be suspended from practicing law as an attorney because the
statute limited the penalty to fine only).
67. 17 P.S. § 2043 (originally enacted as Act of June 16, 1836 (P.L. 784), § 25) (repealed
1976).
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4132 (West 2004):
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments and to
impose summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the
lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.
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4133,69 and 4134. 70 At the same time, the General Assembly passed
a statute, section 4136,71 affording various procedural protectionsincluding the right to bail, 72 the right to notice and to present a defense, 73 and the right upon demand to a jury trial7 4 -in cases in
which a person is charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of a restraining order or injunction issued by a court. Section
4136 also limited the punishment to a fine not exceeding $100 or
imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding fifteen
days, or both. 75 These statutes passed after heated debate on the
floor of the House of Representatives over the division of power be76
tween the legislature and the judiciary.

69. Id. § 4133:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the punishment of commitment for contempt
provided in section 4132 (relating to attachment and summary punishment for contempts) shall extend only to contempts committed in open court. All other contempts
shall be punished by fine only.
70. Id. § 4134:
The court may order the sheriff or other proper officer of any county to take into custody and commit to jail any person fined for a contempt until such fine shall be paid or
discharged. If unable to pay such fine, such person may be committed to jail by the
court for not exceeding three months.
71. Id. § 4136:
(a) General rule.-A person charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of
a restraining order or injunction issued by a court shall enjoy:
(1) The rights to bail that are accorded to persons accused of crime.
(2) The right to be notified of the accusation and a reasonable time to make a
defense, if the alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view or presence of the court.
(3) (i) Upon demand, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
of the judicial district wherein the contempt is alleged to have been committed. ....

72. Id. § 4136(a)(1).
73. Id. § 4136(a)(2).
74. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4136(a)(3)(i) (West 2004).
75. Id. § 4136(b):
Except as otherwise provided in this title or by statute hereafter enacted, punishment
for a contempt specified in subsection (a) may be by fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment not exceeding 15 days in the jail of the county where the court is sitting,
or both, in the discretion of the court. Where a person is committed to jail for the nonpayment of such a fine, he shall be discharged at the expiration of 15 days, but where
he is also committed for a definite time, the 15 days shall be computed from the expiration of the definite time.
76. Some members of the House took the position that the contempt power of the court
should be carefully restricted as to not encroach on legislative power, as shown by the following passages:
I think every member of this House now knows of the problems that we believe exist
in this doctrine of separation of powers and that there has been an erosion of the powers of this legislative body in and through the interpretation of Article V of the constitution.
I believe if we adopt Senate bill No. 935 [hereinafter the "contempt statutes"], we will
in large measure be ratifying many of the court rules which have been adopted and
which have, in effect, repealed laws which we have enacted.
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In 1994, the General Assembly passed three statutes that conferred contempt power on district justices, 77 Pittsburgh Magistrates

LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, 160th Sess., Vol. 1, No. 149, at 5863 (June 29, 1976) (statement of Rep. William H. Eckensberger).
None of us, particularly as lawyers, questions that the Supreme Court should have the
right to make rules. But that right must be more carefully circumscribed than is found
in this conference report ...
[T]his bill as it now stands.., could very well be used.., to vary and change the intent
of this legislature in establishing the jurisdiction of the courts and many, many other
things. ....
All I want to have happen is that . . . this bill . . . does not of itself give to the courts

the power to make laws, which is the power of this General Assembly and not of the
courts. We are supposed to do the legislating and not the courts.
Id. at 5863-64 (statement of Rep. Samuel W. Morris).
There were some pretty serious questions raised in the balance of power between the
legislature and the court. This House has several times in this past month spoken out,
through its voting, to hopefully reform and rectify the problems where we feel the court
has begun to invade the legislative prerogative. To vote for [the contempt statutes]
would be to accelerate that process wherein the legislature has less and less to say
about these matters.
Id. at 5864 (statement of Rep. Stephen R. Reed).
The position of other House members was that any restriction of the court's inherent
contempt power was a violation of the separation of powers and could not be accomplished
by legislation, as demonstrated in the following remarks:
[T]his argument I do not believe can be settled by any legislation. It is going to have
to go to the Supreme Court, because there is a conflict now whereby the constitution
allows the Supreme Court to issue all procedural rules of law and the legislature occasionally gets into the procedural field. It is a very delicate question of what is procedure and what is not, and I think that cannot be resolved by legislation but only in
court cases, which will be many years forthcoming.
Id. at 5863 (statement of Rep. Warren H. Spencer).
[T]he conference committee, during its very brief meeting held this past Monday morning, removed, among other things, from [the contempt statutes] the definition of what
it meant by 'otherwise provided by law.' This House overwhelmingly in the previous
week had decided that the term 'law' shall not include rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 5864 (statement of Rep. Stephen R. Reed).
[Mr. Spencer] has amended a bill . . . which was a constitutional amendment to increase the size of the Superior Court, by requiring that the Supreme Court submit all
of its rules to this General Assembly prior to their approval.
That is the way and the only way, in my judgment, that that matter can be properly
dealt with. It must be dealt with by a constitutional amendment, because the constitution of this Commonwealth grants to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules within its sphere-okay?-and those rules do have the force of law .... It cannot
be dealt with in a bill. We could not by statute expand their rule-making capacity nor
can we contract it. It must be done by constitutional amendment.
Id. (statement of Rep. Norman S. Berson).
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4137:
(a) General rule.-A magisterial district judge shall have the power to issue attachments and impose summary punishments for criminal contempts of a magisterial district judge court in the following cases:
(1) Misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing
the administration of justice.
(2) Failure of a person to obey lawful process in the nature of a subpoena issued
by a magisterial district judge.
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Court judges, 78 and Philadelphia Traffic Court judges. 79 In 1997,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Rules of Criminal Procedure 140,80 141,81 and 14282 to implement the procedure of all three
statutes. Rule 140 establishes a uniform procedure at the trial
level, Rule 141 establishes a uniform procedure for appeal, and Rule
142 establishes a procedure governing defaults in payment of a fine.
In 1995, the General Assembly passed a statute allowing a district judge or judge of the minor judiciary with jurisdiction to hear
summary offenses of persons under 18 years of age to issue an order
specifically requiring the parent, legal guardian, or other person
with whom the child resides if other than the parent or guardian,
"to be present and ready to participate in the proceedings with the
juvenile. '8 3 The statute further provides that a person failing to
(3) Failure to comply with an order of a magisterial district judge directing a
defendant in a criminal proceeding to compensate the victim of the criminal conduct for the damage or injury sustained by the victim.
(4) Failure to comply with an order of a magisterial district judge directing a
defendant in a criminal proceeding to pay fines and costs in accordance with an
installment payment order.
(5) Violation of an order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6110 (relating to emergency relief by minor judiciary). ...
(c) Punishment.-Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(1) or (3) may
be a fine of not more than $100 or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both.
Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(2) shall be a fine of not more than
$100. Failure to pay within a reasonable time could result in imprisonment for not
more than ten days. Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(5) shall be in
accordance with that specified in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(b) (relating to contempt for violation of order or agreement). Punishment for contempt in subsection (a)(4) would be
imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
78. Id. § 4138. Pittsburgh Magistrates Justices have the power to issue attachments and
impose summary punishments for criminal contempts in the following cases:
(1) Misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court thereby obstructing the administration of justice.
(2) Failure of a person to obey lawful process in the nature of a subpoena issued by a
judge of the Pittsburgh Magistrates Court
(3) Failure to comply with an order of a judge of the Pittsburgh Magistrates Court
directing a defendant in a criminal proceeding to pay fines and costs in accordance
with an installment payment order.
Id. § 4138(a). Punishment may be imposed as follows:
Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(1) or (3) may be a fine of not more
than $100 or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both. Punishment for
contempt specified in subsection (a)(2) shall be a fine of not more than $100. Failure
to pay within a reasonable time could result in imprisonment for not more than ten
days.
Id. § 4138(c).
79. Id. § 4139. The Philadelphia Traffic Court judges' powers to issue attachments and
impose summary punishments for criminal contempts are identical to those set out in the
Pittsburgh statute. Id. § 4139(a); see supra note 78. The range of punishments is also identical. Id. § 4139(c).
80. PA. R. CRIM. P. 140.
81. Id. 141.
82. Id. 142.
83. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1523(a) (West 2004).
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comply with an order of participation may be found in contempt of
court "as outlined in section 4137 [of Title 42].184 If the person under order fails to appear at any proceeding, the district justice or
judge shall issue a bench warrant for the person's arrest; however,
the district justice or judge "may waive any fine or other punishment if the person is ... ready to participate in the proceedings with
'8 5
the juvenile after a bench warrant is issued.
2.

The Investigating GrandJury Contempt Statute

In 1978, the General Assembly enacted the Investigating Grand
Jury Act.8 6 Prior to the passage of the Act, the investigative and
inquisitorial powers of the grand jury were clearly established in
the common law of Pennsylvania since 1791.s7 Although investigations are a function of the executive branch, the investigating grand
jury was considered to be "an arm of the court," and "in this Commonwealth . .. judicially supervised from its inception contrary to
the practice in most jurisdictions .
*...
,88 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court regulated the grand jury by imposing certain standards, which became known or referred to as "common law standards,' '8 9 as prerequisites to the calling of an investigating grand
90
jury.
The Act superseded the common law. 91 In the first appellate decision from a civil contempt conviction under the Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a footnote, pointed out that the contemnor
had not asserted that the General Assembly was without authority
to supersede "the common law standards" imposed by the Court's
decisions on grand jury investigations. 92 Two months thereafter,
the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Investigating

84.
85.
86.

Id. § 1523(b); see supra note 77.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1523(c).
Act of Nov. 22, 1978 (P.L. 1148), §§ 1-12 (currently codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.

ANN. §§ 4541-4553 (West 2004)).
87. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 277 A.2d 764, 771 & n.21 (Pa.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1000 (1971). For a discussion of the history of the investigating grand jury in Pennsylvania,
see id. at 771 n.21. See also Petition of McNair, 187 A. 498, 502 n.1 (Pa. 1936) ("The history
of the inquisitorial powers of the grand jury is lost in the obscurity surrounding the origin of
that body."); Lloyd & Carpenter's Case, 5 PA. L.J. 55, 3 Clark 188 (Ct. Qtr. Sess. Phila. 1845).
See generally Bernard L. Segal, Gerald W. Spivack & Barry L. Costilo, ObtainingA Grand
Jury Investigation In Pennsylvania, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 73, 75 (1961).
88. McCloskey, 277 A.2d at 775.

89.

Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, 412 A.2d 556, 558 n.7 (Pa.

1980).

90.

In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila., 415 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa. 1980).

91.
92.

Robert Hawthorne,Inc., 412 A.2d at 559.
Id. at 559 n.8.
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Grand Jury Act on the basis that the Act constituted an impermissible infringement of the power of the judiciary.9 3 The Court also
interpreted an earlier case, Petition of McNair,94 to "clearly impl[y]
[that] the [General Assembly] could broaden the scope of allowable
investigation
by a grand jury" beyond that allowed by the common
95
law.

Section 4549(b) of the Act provides, in part, that "[jurors, attorneys, interpreters, stenographers, operators of recording devices, or
any typists] shall be sworn to secrecy, and shall be in contempt of
court if they reveal any information which they are sworn to keep
secret." After a hearing "for cause shown," the supervising judge
can prevent a witness from disclosing his or her testimony. 96 The
grand jury's power to investigate "shall include the investigative
resources of the grand jury which shall include but not be limited
to the power of subpoena, the power to obtain the initiation of civil
and criminal contempt proceedings, and every investigative power
of any grand jury of the Commonwealth. '97 The attorney for the
Commonwealth or the supervising judge may bring such alleged of98
fenses to the attention of the grand jury.
The manner in which the court swears participants to secrecy is
covered in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 99 A violation of the secrecy oath is an indirect criminal contempt. 100 Secrecy is indispensable to the effective functioning of a grand jury's
investigation and is designed: "(1) to prevent the escape of persons
whose indictment is contemplated; (2) to ensure the freedom of
grand jury deliberations; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or
witness tampering; (4) to encourage free disclosure of information
by witnesses; and (5) to protect an innocent accused from disclosure
that he or she was being investigated and from the expense of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt." 10 1
Under section 4549(c)(3), the supervising judge has the power to
remove a witness's counsel from the grand jury room if the counsel
makes objections or arguments or otherwise addresses the grand
93.
94.

Investigating Grand Jury of Phila., 415 A.2d at 19.
187 A. 498 (Pa. 1936).

95.

Investigating Grand Jury of Phila., 415 A.2d at 19 n.2.

96. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4549(d) (West 2004).
97. Id. § 4548.
98. Id.
99. PA. R. CRIM. P. 224, 225, 231(C). For comparison purposes, "a violation of [an indicting] grand jury secrecy rules may be punished as a contempt of court" under id. 556.10(A)(2).

100.

Recent Case, Grand Jury-Secrecy of Proceedings-Refusal to Take Oath of Secrecy

Held Contempt of Court, 53 HARV. L. REV. 680, 680 (1939-1940).
101. 26A STANDARD PA. PRACTICE 2d, General Rule of Secrecy § 133:38 (citing In re Dauphin Cnty. Fourth Investing Grand Jury, 19 A.3d 491 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted)).
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jury or the attorney for the Commonwealth. The subsection provides that "[v]iolation of this paragraph shall be punishable as contempt by the supervising judge." A violation of this subsection
would be a direct criminal contempt.
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over orders entered
in regard to grand juries, including orders of civil and criminal contempt.102
B.

Crimes Code (Title 18) Statutes

In 1939, the General Assembly adopted the Penal Code. 10 3 Section 5101 of that Code preserved common law offenses not specifically provided for by the Code. 104
In 1973, the General Assembly replaced the Penal Code with the
Crimes Code. 10 5 The General Assembly abolished all common law
crimes 10 6 with the exception of a court's power to declare forfeitures,
to punish for contempt, or "to employ any sanction authorized by
law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree ...."107 Thus, the Crimes Code preserved criminal contempt
as a common law crime.
In 1980, the General Assembly enacted a statute, section 4954 in
Title 18, that gave a court with jurisdiction over any criminal matter the authority to enter a protective order, including geographic
distance and communication stay-away provisions. 108 Another
statute, section 4955, which is titled "Violation of orders," provides
that any person who violates the protective order "may be punished
in any of the following ways:" (1) for any substantive offense described in that subchapter of Title 18;109 (2) "[a]s a contempt of the
court making such order"; 110 and (3) by revocation of any form of

102.

In re Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 509 A.2d 1260, 1261 & n.2 (Pa.

1986) (citing PA. R. APP. P. 702(c), 3331); see also Note to PA. R. APP. P. 3331.

103. 18 P.S. §§ 4101-5201 (1945) (originally enacted as Act of June 24, 1939 (P.L. 872), §§
101-1201) (repealed 1973).
104. Id. § 5101 (originally enacted as Act of June 24, 1939 (P.L. 872), § 1101) (repealed
1973). See generally 1972 Official Comment to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107 (West 1998).
105. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-9352 (West 2000).
106. Id. § 107(b).

107.

Id. § 107(c).

108.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4954 (West 1983).

109. The substantive offenses include intimidation of witnesses or victims, id. § 4952; retaliation against witness, victim or party, id. § 4953; retaliation against prosecutor or judicial
official, id. § 4953.1; protection of employment of crime victims, family members of victims
and witnesses, id. § 4957; and intimidation, retaliation or obstruction in child abuse cases,
id. § 4958. Id. § 4955(a)(1).

110.

Id. § 4955(a)(2).
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pretrial release, including forfeiture of bail. 1 Section 4955 appears
to make it a crime to violate the protective order, although section
4955 does not provide any crime classification (felony, misdemeanor, or summary offense) as permitted by another provision of
the Crimes Code 11 2 and does not set any penalties for the contempt.1 1 3 Section 4955 was amended in 1993 to provide that a person held in contempt is entitled to credit "for any punishment imposed therein against any sentence imposed on [a] conviction"1 1 4 for
the crimes of harassment,1 1 5 stalking,1 1 6 intimidation of witnesses
or victims, 11 7 or retaliation against a witness or a victim. 1 18 A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Title 18 bars a
court from subsequently punishing the offender for contempt arising out of the same act.1 1 9
The 1980 version of section 4955 did not contain any procedural
provisions. The statute might have given prosecutors, who have
prosecutorial discretion to charge, the ability to nullify a court's contempt power by not charging a violation of section 4955. The 1993
version of section 4955 provides that an arrest can be made without
a warrant upon probable cause whether or not the violation is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer 1 20 and the defendant is to be taken without unnecessary delay before the court
that issued the protective order, when available, and before other
specified judicial officers, when the court that issued the order is
1 21
unavailable.
Pertinent to this Title 18 discussion is some sentencing law that
appears in Title 42. In 1974, the General Assembly adopted the
Sentencing Code.1 22 In contempt matters, the Pennsylvania Supe-

111. Id. § 4955(a)(3). See generally 14 West's Pa. Practice § 1:429 (Victim and witness
intimidation-Protective orders and violations); SUMMARY PA. JUR. 2d Criminal Law §§
19:52 to 19:61.
112. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(a) (West 1998).
113. It should be noted that section 106(d) of the Crimes Code provides that "[a]ny offense
declared by law to constitute a crime, without specification of the class thereof, is a misdemeanor of the second degree, if the maximum sentence does not make it a felony under this
section." Id. A person convicted of a misdemeanor of the second degree may be sentenced to
imprisonment of not more than two years, id. § 1104(2), and a fine not exceeding $5,000, id.

§ 1101(5).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

18
18
Id.
18
Id.
Id.
18
Id.
42

PA. CONS. STAT.
PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2709.1.
PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4953.
§ 4955(a)(2)(ii).
PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4955(c).
PA. CONS. STAT.

ANN. § 4955(a)(2)(i) (West 1983).
ANN. § 2709 (West 2000).
ANN. § 4952.

ANN. § 4955(b) (West 1983).
ANN. §§ 9701-9799.41 (West 2014).
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rior Court self-imposed statutory restrictions contained in the Sentencing Code and applicable to crimes in general. One panel of
Pennsylvania Superior Court judges said that while direct criminal
contempt was punishable by fine or imprisonment, 123 the trial court
could choose among the sentencing alternatives authorized by the
Sentencing Code, 124 including probation.1 25 Because the Sentencing
Code requires that a sentence of confinement contain a minimum
and a maximum term and that the minimum not exceed one-half of
the maximum, 1 26 another Superior Court panel sua sponte held that
1 27
a flat sentence for contempt was illegal.
C.

ProtectionFrom Abuse Act (Title 23)

In 1976, the General Assembly passed the Protection From Abuse
Act (PFAA).1 28 The purpose of the PFAA "is to protect victims of
domestic abuse, and it does so through numerous provisions that
enable courts to respond quickly and flexibly to both early signs and
' 129
subsequent acts of abuse with the issuance of protection orders.
Those provisions are both substantive and procedural, and they involve different purposes and powers as the proceeding evolves.
The substantive and procedural provisions prior to any exercise
of a court's contempt power are designed to protect and prevent further abuse by removing the perpetrator of the abuse from the household and contact with the victim for a period of time,1 30 are civil in
nature,1 31 and invoke the equitable powers of the court.1 32 The

123.
124.

See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4133 (West 2004); supra note 69.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721.

125. In reAdams, 645 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (upholding trial court's sentence
of fine plus two concurrent 90-day terms of probation with condition that appellant undergo
a drug, alcohol, and psychological evaluation). See generally Commonwealth v. Falkenhan,
452 A.2d 750, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating generally that a sentence for contempt must
comply with the Sentencing Code).
126.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9756(a)-(b).

127. Commonwealth v. Cain, 637 A.2d 656, 658-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (one-year term
of imprisonment); cf. Commonwealth v. Moody, 46 A.3d 765, 770 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(observing that trial court granted the contemnor's request to modify the sentence to five to
ten days to conform to the Sentencing Code).
128.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-6122 (West 2010).

129. Commonwealth v. Snell, 737 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Snyder v.
Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). See generally Deborah Flynn, Note,
DOMESTICRELATIONS-The ProtectionFrom Abuse Act, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 116 (1978).

130. McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Viruet ex rel.
Velasquez v. Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
131. Boykin v. Brown, 868 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (the PFAA does not seek
to determine criminal culpability); see also 1977 Explanatory Comment to PA. R. CIV. P.
1901.7 (indicating that the PFAA "introduces a new civil remedy").
132. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767, 775-76 (Ct. Com. P1. Allegheny Cnty. 1979).
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PFAA defines "abuse,"1 33 requires law enforcement agencies to provide the abused person with notice of the availability of safe shelter
and of domestic violence services in the community, 134 confers jurisdiction over all proceedings on a court,1 35 gives a plaintiff who is in
immediate and present danger of abuse the ability to file a petition 36 to obtain a temporary order,1 37 creates a structure of available hearing officers to issue ex parte temporary emergency orders
when the courts are closed,1 38 provides that the temporary order is
to expire at the end of the next business day that the court is avail139
able but allows a court to maintain the status quo until a hearing,
1 40
and requires a hearing within ten business days of the petition.
Some of the procedural provisions require legislative and judicial
sharing, in that the court may order the sheriff or other designated
agency or individual to serve the petition and order,1 41 and the General Assembly mandated that the court "adopt a means of prompt
and effective service in those instances where the plaintiff avers
that service cannot be safely effected by an adult individual other
than a law enforcement officer where the court orders. 1' 42 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acceded to the General Assembly's
mandate by adopting multiple service of process provisions in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 143 Unlike the General Assembly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly provided a procedure for commencement of an action by presenting a petition to
1 44
the court or filing a petition with the prothonotary.
The General Assembly gave the courts the authority to hold a de1 45
fendant who violates a PFAA order in indirect criminal contempt.
After the entry of an order and a violation, the proceedings are criminal in nature and the purpose is to punish the violator. 146 The po-

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (West 2010).
Id. § 6105(b).
Id. § 6103(a).
Id. § 6105(b) (by implication).
Id. § 6107(b).
Id. § 6110.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110(b) (West 2010).
Id. § 6107(a).
Id. § 6106(f).
Id. § 6106(e).
PA. R. CIV. P. 1901.4(a), 1930.4.

144. Id. 1901.3.
145. Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 887
A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005).
146. Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162, 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting),
appeal denied, 578 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1990); Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979).
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lice or sheriff can arrest the contemnor without warrant upon probable cause whether or not the violation is committed in the presence
of the police officer or sheriff,1 47 at which time the defendant is to
be brought without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer for
preliminary arraignment. 148 The procedure for preliminary arraignment is established by Supreme Court rule.1 49 A hearing must
be scheduled within ten days of the filing of criminal charges or
complaint of indirect criminal contempt.1 50 The defendant is entitled to counsel1

51

152
but has no right to a jury trial.

When there is a noneconomic violation, a plaintiff may file a private criminal complaint against a defendant, alleging indirect criminal contempt.1 5 3 The General Assembly did not exercise complete
power over procedure, as the General Assembly deferred to local
court rule for the procedure for filing and service of a private crim1 54

inal complaint.

The General Assembly also gave the court the authority to impose
punishment for the indirect criminal contempt "in accordance with
law. 115 5 The General Assembly limited a sentence to imprisonment

of up to six months, supervised probation not to exceed six months,
a fine of not less than $300 but not more than $1,000, and an order
for other relief as set forth in the PFAA.1 56 In one Superior Court
panel decision, two judges held that a minimum and maximum sentence was not required, 15 7 while the dissenting judge held that the
1
Sentencing Code did apply.

147.
148.

58

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(a) (West 2010).
Id. §§ 6113(c), (d).

149. PA. R. CRIM. P. 519. The Comment to Rule 519 contains the following statement and
citations: "By statute, a defendant may not be released but must be brought before the issuing authority for a preliminary arraignment .. .when a police officer has arrested the defendant in a domestic violence case, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 2711. See also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6113(c) of
the Protection from Abuse Act."
150. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(f).
151. Id. § 6114(b)(3).
152. Id.; see Hill v. Randolph, 24 A.3d 866, 873 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (looking to Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 847 (Pa. 2008), and holding that defendant's two indirect
criminal contempt charges for violating a PFAA order, which exposed him to an aggregate
sentence greater than six months, did not afford him a jury trial, as the determining factor
is whether any single offense can result in a term of incarceration greater than six months).
153.
154.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113.1(a) (West 2010).
Id. § 6113.1(b).

155. Id. § 6114(a).
156. Id. § 6114(b)(1).
157. Wagner v. Wagner, 564 A.2d 162,165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); accord 24 STANDARD PA.
PRACTICE 2d, Domestic Relations Actions § 126:131.
158. Wagner, 564 A.2d at 165 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge said that:
Because the legislature has not specifically exempted sentences for criminal contempt
under the Protection From Abuse Act from the general mandate that all sentences
must have a minimum and a maximum, I would not imply such an exemption. ... Rather, in absence of an express exemption I am of the opinion that we must enforce the

588
D.
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Vehicle Code (Title 75) Statute

159
In 1976, the General Assembly also passed the Vehicle Code.
Chapter 41, titled "Equipment Standards," 16 0 establishes minimum
standards for vehicle equipment, the performance of which is related to vehicle safety, noise control, and air quality, and makes unlawful the sale and use of items that do not comply with the minimum standards.1 61 Another statute provides for criminal penalties
in the form of a fine per violation and the maximum permissible
fine,16 2 the particulars of which are not relevant to this article. Another statute provides that, upon petition by the Commonwealth's
Department of Transportation, any court of competent jurisdiction
may restrain violations of Chapter 41 by issuing "an injunction or
restraining order."1 6 3 The same statute provides that the court
shall sit without a jury in any proceeding for criminal contempt for
violation of the injunction or restraining order. 164

E.

The Pennsylvania Constitution

After a constitutional convention from 1967 to 1968, article V,
section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted. 16 5 That
provision provided, in relevant part, that "[t]he Supreme Court
shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice,
procedure and the conduct of all courts .. . [and] justices of the
peace .... All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are

inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions."1 6 6 Section 10(c) grants the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure, and conduct of
all courts, thereby giving the judiciary the sole power to establish
the rules of the court.16 7 This constitutional grant of authority is
exclusive to the judiciary, and the General Assembly is precluded
provisions of the sentencing code, including the requirement of both a minimum and a
maximum term for imprisonment.
Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
159. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-9901 (West 2008).
160. Id. §§ 4101-4108.
161. Id. § 4101.
162. Id. § 4107(d).
163. Id. §§ 4108(a), (c).
164. Id. § 4108(c).
165. Adopted in 1968 as proposed by Proposal No. 7, 1968, effective January 1, 1969.
166. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). For commentary on how article V, section 10(c) has made
the Pennsylvania judiciary a stronger branch compared to its sister branches, see Jason Bologna, An Abuse ofPower: How the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Uses Article V, 10(c) ofthe

Pennsylvania Constitution to Dominate Procedural Lawmaking, and Why Pennsylvania
Should Amend This ConstitutionalProvision, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 711 (1998).

167.

Bergdollv. Kane, 694 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
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from exercising limitations on the powers entrusted in the judiciary
by the constitution.1 6 8 The second sentence of section 10(c), which
suspends all statutes inconsistent with court rules, played a prominent part in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in McMullen.16 9 All of the Supreme Court's criminal procedural rules are
1 70
adopted under the authority of article V, section 10(c).
After the General Assembly's enactment of sections 4137, 4138,
and 4139 of Title 42, which provide that any punishment for contempt will be "automatically stayed for a period of ten days"1 71 during which time an appeal of an action of a district justice, a Pittsburgh Magistrates Court judge, or a Philadelphia Traffic Court
judge may be filed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended
that provision "only insofar as [those provisions are] inconsistent
with the 30-day appeal period and 30-day automatic stay period set
''
forth in Rule 141. 172

In summary, the contempt power derived from common law and
is inherent in the courts. The General Assembly passed statutes
limiting the exercise of the contempt power by courts of record while
extending the power to inferior courts. The General Assembly also
created not less than four statutory forms of indirect criminal contempt: the Investigating Grand Jury (Title 42) contempt statute,
the Crimes Code contempt statute, the PFAA contempt statute, and
the Vehicle Code contempt statute. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court promoted the General Assembly's influence by applying general criminal statutes to contempt crimes. The pre-McMullen legal
landscape therefore consisted of a patchwork of statutes and court
rules affecting a court's power of contempt. However, in 2008,
Pennsylvania's own Marbury v. Madison 73 would restrict the General Assembly's ability to legislate in the field of criminal contempt.
III.

THE FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MCMULLEN

Over a two-year period, Richard McMullen improperly communicated with the female complainant by following the complainant,
sending the complainant letters, and threatening her.1 74 In October

168.

L.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm'n, 744 A.2d 798, 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See infra text accompanying notes 206-07.
See PA. R. CRIM. P. 102.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4137(d), 4138(d), 4139(d) (West 2004).
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1101(1).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).

174. Brief for Appellee at 4, Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2008) (Nos.
43 EAP 2006, 44 EAP 2006).

Duquesne Law Review

590

Vol. 53

2001, McMullen pled guilty to stalking, terroristic threats, harassment by communication, and harassment. 175 The court subsequently sentenced McMullen to eleven and one-half to twenty-three
months of incarceration, granted McMullen immediate parole to
house arrest followed by two years of reporting probation, and ordered McMullen to stay away from the complainant. 176 A year later,
McMullen violated his parole and the "stay away" order by leaving
the jurisdiction without permission, by contacting the complainant,
and by threatening to kill the complainant. 77 McMullen, who was
then residing in Florida, was arrested and extradited to Pennsylva1 78
nia.
As a result of violating his parole, the trial court judge revoked
McMullen's probation and re-sentenced him to a total term of imprisonment of three to six years.1 79 The trial court also found
McMullen guilty of six counts of contempt of court for violations of
the stay-away order, and for each contempt count the trial court
sentenced McMullen to two months and twenty-eight days to five
months and twenty-nine days of imprisonment, totaling a maxi18 0
mum sentence of almost three years.
McMullen appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, claiming that the terms of imprisonment accompanying the six consecutive contempt sentences exceeded the statutory maximum for indirect criminal contempt,1 81 thereby violating his right to due process
under both the United States1 8 2 and Pennsylvania 8 3 Constitutions.
Furthermore, McMullen argued that his contempt sentences were
punishable by fine only, and not imprisonment, pursuant to section
4133.184 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, did not consider McMullen's section 4133 argument and instead raised section
18
4136's constitutionality sua sponte. 5
The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that although the trial
court was in fact authorized to impose punishment for indirect
175.

Commonwealth v. McMullen, 881 A.2d 841, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).

176.

Id.

177.

Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 845 (Pa. 2008).

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 66, 75 and accompanying text.

182. McMullen contended he was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 881 A.2d 841, 845 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005) (quoting McMullen's brief).
183. McMullen contended he was entitled to a jury trial under article I, sections 6 and 9
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
184.

Id. at 846; see supra note 66 and accompanying text, and note 69.

185. See Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 850 (Pa. 2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring).
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criminal contempt, each of the sentences exceeded the fifteen-day
18 6
maximum set forth in section 4136(b) and were therefore illegal.
The Superior Court also determined that McMullen was entitled to
a jury trial under section 4136(a)(3)(i). 18 7 The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court's contempt order and remanded
18 8
for further proceedings.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for allocator,18 9 which was
granted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to resolve the following constitutional issue: "Did the Legislature unconstitutionally
usurp [the Supreme Court's] authority when it enacted a statute
that grants a jury trial in all indirect criminal contempt cases involving the violation of a restraining order or injunction, and limits
any sentence of imprisonment to [fifteen] days?"1 90
A.

The Majority Opinion

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Eakin and joined by
four of the seven Justices, 91 the Court reviewed under a de novo
standard of review the purely legal question as to whether the General Assembly usurped the court's inherent authority by passing
section 4136(a)(3)(i) and section 4136(b).1 92 Applying the strong
presumption that statutes are constitutional,1 93 the Court determined that section 4136 violated the Supreme Court's exclusive authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to establish rules of
procedure and a court's inherent authority to punish for indirect
1 94
criminal contempt.
First, the Court reasoned that McMullen did not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury trial because the due process provisions of
the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions apply to criminal defendants facing a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six

186.

Id. at 849 (majority opinion); see supra note 75.

187.

McMullen, 881 A.2d at 850-51; see supra note 71.

188. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 881 A.2d 841, 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
189. "This word formally indicated that a writ, bill, or other pleading was allowed. It is
still used today in Pennsylvania to denote permission to appeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
88 (9th ed. 2009).
190. McMullen, 961 A.2d at 846 (quoting Petition for Allowance of Appeal).
191. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 845 (Pa. 2008).
192.
193.

Id. at 846.
Id. (noting that under the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 1922(3) (West 2008), there is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate
federal and state constitutions when enacting legislation).
194.

Id. at 849-50.
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months. 195 The Court noted that because section 4136(b) only allows for a maximum sentence of fifteen days, the constitutional
196
right to a jury trial did not apply to any single count of contempt.
Furthermore, the Court explained that consecutive sentences could
not be combined to meet the constitutional requirement; therefore,
McMullen's six consecutive sentences could not be aggregated to
create a sentence greater than six months and provide McMullen
1
with a constitutional right to a jury trial.

97

Second, the Court determined that based on Pennsylvania precedent, a criminal defendant's right to a trial by jury was a procedural
right and not a substantive right.1 98 The majority explained that
the legislature was restricted to creating substantive law while the
Court's rulemaking authority extended to procedural law.1 99 To determine whether a statute violates article V, section 10(c) of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the Court simply inquires whether the
statute is substantive or procedural in nature. 200 In a prior decision,
Commonwealth v. Sorrell,201 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that "the right to trial by jury is not a 'substantive right,' but
a right of procedure through which rights conferred by substantive
20 3
law are enforced. '20 2 The Court reaffirmed the ruling of Sorrell
20 4
that a jury trial is a procedural right.
After determining that section 4136(a)(3)(i) was a procedural
statute enacted by the legislature, the Court found the statute unconstitutional. The Court explained that a procedural statute
would be unconstitutional even if the Court has not promulgated a
rule inconsistent with the statute. 20 5 The majority looked to the
195.

Id.

at 847 (citing Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1996); Common-

wealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa. 1974)).
196.

Id.

197. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 847 (Pa. 2008) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at
327-28).
198. See id. at 847-48.
199. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); Payne v. Commonwealth Dep't of Corr., 871 A.2d
795, 801 (Pa. 2005)). The majority opinion explains the difference between procedural and
substantive law: "As a general rule, substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights;
procedural law addresses the method by which those rights are enforced." Id. at 847.
200. Id. (citing Payne, 871 A.2d at 801).
201. 456 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1982).
202. McMullen, 961 A.2d at 847-48 (citing Sorrell, 456 A.2d at 1329).
203. Citing Mishoe v. Erie Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Pa. 2003), and Wertz v. Chapman
Twp., 741 A.2d 1272, 1279 (Pa. 1999), the majority noted that there are post-Sorrell decisions
that find that a jury trial may be a substantive right; the majority explained, however, that
those decisions do not overrule or mention Sorrell nor do they hold that a jury trial is a substantive right. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2008).
204. The McMullen court's position was that the Sorrellcourt's pronouncement that a jury
trial was a procedural right was not limited to the context of the jury-enlarging statute at
issue in Sorrell. Id. at 848.
205. Id.
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Pennsylvania Constitution for support, noting that article V, section 10(c) allows the Court automatically to suspend a procedural
statute that conflicts with the Court's procedural rules. 20 6 The
Court reasoned that these concepts must be so, because otherwise
"a clearly unconstitutional statute would be constitutional unless
'20 7
this Court promulgated a rule inconsistent with it.
Furthermore, the Court found section 4136(b), which sets forth
the punishment for indirect criminal contempt, to be unconstitutional under the same test applied to the jury trial provision. 20 8 In
determining the question whether section 4136(b) was procedural
or substantive, the majority repeated former Justice Roberts' recognition that "substantive law declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for their commission, while procedural law
'20 9
provides the means by which the substantive law is enforced.
The majority noted that the legislature's actions in prescribing punishment for many crimes were consistent with former Justice Rob2 10
erts' distinction between substantive law and procedural law.
Without any further discussion about the distinction between substantive law and procedural law, the Court determined that contempt of court was unlike other substantive crimes and derived not
from a statute the legislature had created, but rather from the in2 11
herent power of the courts.
Lastly, the majority found section 4136(b) to unconstitutionally
restrict a court's authority to punish for indirect criminal contempt
because section 4136(b) imposes a maximum fine and incarceration.
The Court found that in adopting section 4136(b) the legislature
created a form of indirect criminal contempt. 21 2 Pursuant to case
law and the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Court held that only
the judiciary has the authority to punish individuals in violation of

206.
207.
208.

Id.; see also supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
McMullen, 961 A.2d at 848.
Id. at 848-49.

209. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 435 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1981) (Roberts, J., opinion in support of affirmance)).
210. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Ward, 568 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. 1990) (burglary and
robbery); Commonwealth v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1172, 1179 (Pa. 1986) (voluntary manslaughter);
Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985) (third degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault
and/or kidnapping); Commonwealth v. Glover, 156 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. 1959) (illegally giving
away drugs); Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 473-74 (Pa. 1958) (first degree murder and armed robbery)).
211.

Id. at 849.

212. Id. at 849-50 ("Since courts have the authority to punish individuals in violation of
their orders under the case law described above and [18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.] § 107(c) [(West
1998)], the legislature cannot create a form of indirect criminal contempt and restrict a
court's ability to punish individuals who commit contempt of court.").
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a court order and that the legislature overstepped its bounds by enacting a form of indirect criminal contempt and restricting a court's
ability to punish individuals found in contempt. 213 The majority explained that "[w]hile the legislature generally may determine the
appropriate punishment for criminal conduct, indirect criminal
contempt is an offense against the court's inherent authority, not
necessarily against the public. '214 Because section 4136(b) restricts
the Court by setting maximum penalties for indirect contempt of
215
court, the statute is unconstitutional.
B.

Chief Justice Castille's Concurring Opinion

Chief Justice Castille agreed with the majority opinion in its entirety. The Chief Justice wrote a concurring opinion to address two
points: (1) the supervisory rule violated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court; and (2) the separation of powers implicated by section
216
4136(b).
According to Chief Justice Castille, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court overstepped its role as an appellate court by sua sponte raising the issue of a right to a jury trial under section 4136.217 Chief
Justice Castille pointed out that the Commonwealth and McMullen
disagreed about the basis for the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision to remand the case to the trial court to give McMullen the
option to elect a jury trial for the contempt violation. 2 18 The Superior Court's "unnecessary holding" regarding McMullen's right to a
jury trial created a circumstance where the court was required to
2 19
address an avoidable constitutional issue in the first instance.
Chief Justice Castille also elaborated on his take of the majority's
reasoning for finding section 4136(b) unconstitutional. Chief Justice Castille echoed the majority, stating, "It is axiomatic that the
General Assembly can legislate crimes, including appropriate punishment. Generally, it is the province of the General Assembly to
prescribe punishment for criminal conduct. '220 The Chief Justice

213. Id.
214. Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
215. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 850 (Pa. 2008). The Court further noted
that the legislature could address the prohibited and punished behaviors in section 4136 by
criminalizing and setting punishments for their commission. Id. However, this approach
would not apply to contempt because contempt is a violation of a court order and is unique
to the courts. Id.
216. Id. (Castille, C.J., concurring).

217.

Id. at 851.

218.
219.
220.

Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.
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pointed out, however, that contempt of court is different from other
crimes and "different in a way that implicates the fundamental separation of powers of the branches of government. '221 As explained
by Chief Justice Castille, individuals charged with indirect criminal
contempt are afforded the procedural safeguards under the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions as well as under Pennsylvania statutory law and criminal procedure. 222 More generally,
however, criminal contempt is sui generis, or unique in its charac22 3
teristics, because it implicates fundamental judicial authority.
Explaining that "the courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with lawful orders through contempt, including the power
to impose punishment for non-compliance," Chief Justice Castille
22 4
agreed with the majority's reasoning.
To aid in explaining why the General Assembly's authority to fix
the appropriate punishment for criminal conduct does not extend to
the separate and distinct crime of criminal contempt, Chief Justice
Castille employed a useful comparison: criminal contempt is an offense against the court, while other offenses are against the public
and codified in the "Crimes Code, Vehicle Code, drug offenses and
the like. '' 225 Chief Justice Castille's view was that only a court that
is violated is in the position to set the appropriate punishment; the
legislature "cannot dictate to the courts what is adequate punishment to vindicate a court's authority. ' 226 Allowing the legislature
to do so, in Chief Justice Castille's view, would "destroy the judiciary's ability to address contempt. ' 22 7 Chief Justice Castille firmly
believes that the trial courts must be able to freely exercise their
contempt power, subject to judicial review, 228 which review will prevent trial court abuses of the contempt power.

221. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 853 (Pa. 2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring).
222. Id. (citing Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. Moran, 560 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Charlett, 391 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Pa. 1978)).
223.

Id. at 853.

224. Id. at 853-54 (citing Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759,
763 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Haefner, 368 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. 1977); In re Martorano,
346 A.2d 22, 27 (Pa. 1975); East Caln Twp. v. Carter, 269 A.2d 703, 705 (Pa. 1970); Brocker
v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1968)).
225.
226.

McMullen, 961 A.2d at 854.
Id.

227. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 854 (Pa. 2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring)
("[F]or what would there be to prevent the General Assembly from limiting punishment to
something completely toothless such as, for instance, a five dollar fine?").
228.

Id.
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Justice Greenspan'sConcurring Opinion

Justice Greenspan joined the majority opinion and Chief Justice
Castille's concurring opinion. Echoing Chief Justice Castille's criticism of the Pennsylvania Superior Court panel, Justice Greenspan
also believed that "[t]he panel was not authorized to convert appellant's constitutional claim into one based on the statutory right to
a jury trial apparently granted by [section 4136].1"229
Using a footnote that consists of dicta, Justice Greenspan calls
2 30
into question the constitutionality of another contempt statute.
Justice Greenspan points out that McMullen initially claimed that
his contempt sentences violated section 4133, because section 4133
permits a "fine only" for indirect criminal contempt but the trial
court imposed multiple sentences of imprisonment.23 1 Justice
Greenspan suggested that under the majority's reasoning, section
4133 could also be found to unconstitutionally infringe on a court's
authority to enforce its own orders.2 3 2 However, because section
4133 was not in front of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Court
could not rule on that issue.2 3 3 Justice Greenspan's concurrence
provides a window of opportunity for future litigants to challenge
section 4133's constitutionality.
Justice Greenspan expresses the view, in other dicta, that the
General Assembly is not prohibited from authorizing court orders
in particular areas of the law:
The General Assembly certainly may legislate in a given area
of the law (such as in the case of Protection From Abuse matters), and may authorize court orders and punishments for
their violation in the context of those areas. The resulting
court orders in such cases are legislatively authorized by statute.

234

This theme will be explored in Part V, infra.

229.

Id. (Greenspan, J., concurring).

230.
231.
232.

Id. at 855 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 855.

233. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 855 n.2 (Pa. 2008) (Greenspan, J., concurring).
234.

Id. at 855.
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Justice Saylor's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Looking solely to Sorrell,235 Justice Saylor agreed with the majority that a jury trial was a procedural right.23 6 Diverging from the
majority, Justice Saylor interpreted section 4136 as having "significant substantive aspects and, thus, [as] not [being] violative of
'237
Jus[a]rticle 5, [s]ection 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
tice Saylor strayed from the majority in that he would allow some
flexibility in the legislature's creating rules of procedure where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet ruled as long as those
rules "are reasonable and do not unduly impinge on [the] Court's
constitutionally prescribed powers and prerogatives. '238
Ultimately, Justice Saylor concluded that section 4136 is a reasonable
statute because it operates as a restriction on the contempt power,
23 9
which can be susceptible to abuse.
IV.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE POST-MCMULLEN (CURRENT TO
DECEMBER 31, 2014)

After McMullen, there has been only one Pennsylvania appellate
court decision addressing the question whether a lower court judge
240
properly exercised contempt power. In Commonwealth v. Moody,
which was decided three years and seven months after McMullen,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, with no mention of McMullen, restated that a court has the inherent power to summarily punish for
contempt but stated that the power was limited by section 4132.241
The constitutionality of section 4132 was not addressed.
A little more than three years after McMullen, the Comment to
Rule 140 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended to include, in part, the following language: "42 Pa.C.S. §§
4137(c), 4138(c), and 4139(c) contain limitations upon the punishment that a minor court may impose for contempt. Such statutory

235.

456 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1982); see supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.

236. McMullen, 961 A.2d at 855 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting).
237. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 456 A.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Pa. 1982) (Nix, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted)).
238. Id. at 855-56 (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 702 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor,
J., concurring)).
239. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 856 (Pa. 2008) (Saylor, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Justice Scalia's statement in his concurring opinion in International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 840 (1994), that the contempt
power is "out of accord with our usual notions of fairness and separation of powers.").
240. 46 A.3d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 79 A.3d
1093 (Pa. 2013).
241.

Id. at 772.
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limitations were held to be unconstitutional in Com. v. McMullen,
599 Pa. 435, 961 A.2d 842 (2008)."242
On June 19, 2013, the General Assembly abolished the Philadelphia Traffic Court 243 through a law that transferred the court's jurisdiction for moving violations to the Philadelphia Municipal
Court. 244 The same piece of legislation allows for the appointment
of hearing officers. 245 Section 4139 remains unaltered following the
Traffic Court's abolishment; however, the Court amended the comments to Rules 140, 141, and 142 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure to provide that the contempt power previously
granted to Traffic Court judges does not apply to the new hearing
officers .246
On March 21, 2014, the General Assembly adopted legislation,
effective July 1, 2015, that permits a victim of sexual violence or
247
intimidation to petition a court for protection from a defendant.
After the victim files the petition, the court issues a protection order
and directs service of the petition and protection order on the defendant. 248 The court must schedule a hearing within ten business
days of the filing of the petition. 249 After the hearing, "[t]he court
may issue an order or approve a consent agreement to protect the
plaintiff, as appropriate, from the defendant, ' 2 50 which order or consent agreement may include stay-away provisions. 25 1 The order
must include a notice that violations of the order will subject the

242.

See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.

243. A constitutional amendment will be necessary to abolish the traffic court in its entirety.
Philadelphia Traffic Court Abolition Final Report, 1 n.2, available at
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/450crim-rpt.pdf?cb=1?cb=/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2015).
244.

See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1123(a)(9) (West Supp. 2014) (jurisdiction over sum-

mary offenses under the Vehicle Code).
245.
246.

Id. § 1127.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 140, 141, 142:

Pursuant to Act 17 of 2013, P.L. 55, No. 17 (June 19, 2013), the jurisdiction and functions of the Philadelphia Traffic Court were transferred to the Philadelphia Municipal
Court Traffic Division. The terminology is retained in these rules because the Philadelphia Traffic Court, which is created by the Pennsylvania Constitution, has not been
disestablished by constitutional amendment. Hearing officers of the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division do not have contempt powers of Philadelphia Traffic
Court judges under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4139.
247.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 62A01-62A20 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Regular Ses-

sion) (effective July 1, 2015).
248. Id. §§ 62A05(a), (d)(2).
249.
250.
251.

Id. § 62A06(a).
Id. § 62A07(a).
Id. § 62A07(b)(1).

Summer 2015

Commonwealth v. McMullen

defendant to arrest or contempt of court. 252
In the event of a violation of the order, a police officer or sheriff
is to arrest the defendant and bring him without unnecessary delay
before a court for preliminary arraignment; a hearing is to be scheduled within ten business days. 25 3 The "court may hold the defendant in indirect criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with law.''254 The new law provides that the defendant
shall not have the right to a jury trial on the charge of indirect criminal contempt "[n]otwithstanding section 4136(a) (relating to rights
' '255
of persons charged with certain indirect criminal contempts).
The possible punishments are identical to those of the PFAA: a fine
of not less than $300 but not more than $1,000, and supervised probation or imprisonment not to exceed six months. 256 "Disposition of
a charge of indirect criminal contempt shall not preclude the prosecution of other criminal charges associated with the incident giving rise to the contempt," and vice versa. 257 If a defendant receives
a sentence of incarceration, the appropriate releasing authority or
other official as designated by local rule is to use all reasonable
means to notify the victim sufficiently in advance of the release of
258
the offender.
In December 2014, the Minor Court Rules Committee published
for comment proposed changes to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to procedures for protection of victims of domes259
tic violence to include victims of sexual violence or intimidation.
V.

ANALYSIS OF MCMULLEN AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS

In McMullen, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court preserved the
power of the courts to exercise their inherent contempt power. Four
of the six justices were emphatic that "the legislature cannot create

252.
253.

Id. § 62A07(e).
Id. §§ 62A12(b)(1), (c), (e).

254.

Id. § 62A14(a).

255. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 62A14(d)(1) (West, Westlaw current through 2014 Regular
Session) (effective July 1, 2015). Section 4136(a)(3)(i) of the Judicial Code, which granted the
right of a jury trial upon demand, was ruled unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. McMullen,
961 A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2008). See supra notes 205-07. The reference to section 4136(a) is
likely the result of the General Assembly's not yet having amended section 4136(a) to reflect
the McMullen decision.
256.

Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 62A14(d)(2), with 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §

6114(b) (West 2010).
257.
258.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 62A14(f).
Id. § 62A14(e)(1).

259. Proposed amendments to Rules 1201-1211 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before
Magisterial District Judges, 44 Pa. Bull. 7642 (Dec. 13, 2014).
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a form of indirect criminal contempt and restrict a court's ability to
punish individuals who commit contempt of court; '260 "the legislature cannot legislate indirect criminal 'contempt,' as it is a violation
of a court order, which the court inherently has the authority to
punish for its violation; ' 261 and "the legislature cannot enact procedural law. '262 Certainly, the majority opinion sends a strong message that legislative incursions into the inherent contempt power of
the courts would not be welcome. Two Justices were inclined to
263
permit limited legislative action.
Although the "dividing lines among the three [coequal] branches
[of government] 'are sometimes indistinct and are probably incapable of any precise definition ,' ' 264 the balance of powers with respect
to the inherent contempt power as codified in the Title 42 statutes
is set forth in the following chart:
Authority of
the General
Assembly To
Enact A Law
That:

Pre-McMullen
Crimes
Other Than
Criminal
Contempt
Contempt

Post-McMullen
Crimes
Other Than
Criminal
Contempt
Contempt

Yes 26 5

Yes 266

Yes 26 7

No 268

Fixes the

Yes269

Yes270

Yes2 7 1

N0272

Penalty
Sets
the
Pedure
ProcedureII

Yes 2 73

Yes 2 74

N0

Creates A
Crime

2 75

No

2 76

260. McMullen, 961 A.2d at 850.
261. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 850 (Pa. 2008).
262. Id. at 847.
263. Id. at 854-55 (Greenspan, J., concurring); id. at 855-56 (Saylor, J., concurring and
dissenting).
264. Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 705 (Pa. 1977) (quoting Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d
474, 482 (Pa. 1969) (plurality opinion)).
265. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part II.A.
267. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 212-14, 260-61 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part II.A.
271. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 213-15, 260 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 5; Commonwealth v. Church, 522 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Cano, 133 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa.), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 182 (1957).
274. See supra Part II.A.
275. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 199, 205 and accompanying text.
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McMullen left unanswered the question whether and to what extent the General Assembly can legislate indirect criminal contempt
in police power areas. McMullen does not answer the question because McMullen involved a general contempt statute under the Judicial Code (Title 42), which covers judicial procedure, not a police
power statute outside Title 42. As discussed above in Part II, prior
to McMullen the General Assembly legislated three forms of indirect criminal contempt in traditional police power areas: the
Crimes Code (Title 18) contempt statute, the PFAA (Title 23) contempt statute, and the Vehicle Code (Title 75) contempt statute.
The General Assembly legislated within Title 42 one form of direct
criminal contempt-section 1523(a), which relates to the presence
in court of the parent or guardian of a juvenile charged with a summary offense-and one form of indirect criminal contempt-the Investigating Grand Jury contempt statute. After McMullen, the
General Assembly legislated one form of indirect criminal contempt
in a police power area by enacting the Sexual Victim Protection (Title 42) contempt statute.
McMullen also left unanswered the related question whether the
inherent contempt power naturally extends into areas within the
General Assembly's police power, such that courts can issue orders
of protection and restraint in those areas without a specific grant of
legislative authority. Courts do not need the permission of the legislature to adopt rules of procedure that allow courts to issue protective and restraining orders in civil 2 77 and criminal 278 cases to control the proceedings before the court. 279 One Pennsylvania Superior
Court decision, however, suggests that a specific grant of legislative
authority is necessary for a court to issue a protective order in a
police power area. In In re R.A., 280 a panel held that under section
4954 of Title 18, the General Assembly authorized only judges with
jurisdiction over any criminal matter to enter a protective order;
therefore, a juvenile court judge lacked statutory authority to issue
a protective order. 28 1 The protective order in In re R.A. stated that
no person shall take any adverse action of any kind against the assault victim, who was a teacher, as well as all teachers and staff

277. PA. R. CIV. P. 1531 (Injunctions); id. 4012 (Protective Orders).
278. PA. R. CRIM. P. 110 (Special Orders Governing Widely-Publicized or Sensational
Cases); id. 569(c) (Examination of Defendant by Mental Health Expert); id. 573(F) (Pretrial
Discovery and Inspection Protective Orders).
279. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 343 (West 2004) (quoted
supra note 7).

280.
281.

761 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 1225 (emphasis added).
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employed by the school district who find themselves as victims of
crime.28 2
McMullen's broad holdings and various opinions permit three
possible interpretations. One interpretation is that no legislative
action is permitted in the field of contempt. Under this interpretation, the General Assembly's police power is limited to legislating
substantive crimes other than indirect criminal contempt and fixing the penalties for their violation. The General Assembly could
still authorize courts to issue orders of protection and restraint.
The General Assembly need not, or should not, use the term "contempt" because once a violation of a court order occurs, the inherent
power of the court commences and the courts get to determine,
through their own procedural rules, how to use the power and what
the penalty will be.
A second interpretation is that McMullen is limited to the general
contempt powers in Title 42 and does not apply to police power areas. The police power statutes are an exception to McMullen's precepts in that the General Assembly can legislate indirect criminal
contempt and fix the penalty for its violation. This is the view
stated by Justice Greenspan, who would even allow the General Assembly to fix the penalty for contempt. 28 3 Justice Greenspan distinguishes protective and restraining orders in police power areas from
a "court's general orders of injunction and restraint" on the basis
that the former "are legislatively authorized by statute" and finds
no fault with that legislative authorization because "[t]he General
Assembly certainly may legislate in a given area of law (such as in
the case of Protection From Abuse matters) and may authorize
court orders and punishments for their violation in the context of
'284
those areas.
Two other McMullen opinions could be read to suggest that indirect criminal contempt statutes in police power areas are constitutional because they are aimed at the public welfare rather than the
authority of the court. The majority opinion and Chief Justice Cas-

282. Id. A court does not need a specific grant of legislative authority to exercise its inherent contempt power during proceedings before the court. In In re Crawford, 519 A.2d 978
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), a juvenile delinquency case, a panel held that a judge could find a
juvenile in contempt when the juvenile did not obey a subpoena and court order to appear in
court. The panel said that the contempt finding was "properly within the inherent and statutory power of the court .. .irrespective of the Juvenile Act," which did not authorize contempt. Id. at 980. The panel cited section 323 of the Judicial Code for the statutory support.
Id. Section 323 is a general powers statute that applies to all courts. See supra note 7.
283. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.

284.
ring).

Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 855 (Pa. 2008) (Greenspan, J., concur-
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tille's concurring opinion recognize the public-welfare and authority-of-the-court distinction. The majority opinion notes that "indirect criminal contempt is an offense against the court's inherent authority, not necessarily against the public. '' 28 5 In his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Castille recognizes that criminal contempt "is
not the same as offenses against the public encompassed by the
' 286
Crimes Code, Vehicle Code, drug offenses and the like.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Greenspan does not specify the
extent of the penalty that the General Assembly can fix, which leads
to a third possible interpretation. The third interpretation is that
the General Assembly can legislate indirect criminal contempt and
fix the penalty as long as the General Assembly does not diminish
the sentencing power of a judge sitting without a jury. The Constitution allows a judge to jail a contemnor for up to six months with28 7
out providing a jury trial.
Regardless of which of the three interpretations a court might
endorse, indirect criminal contempt statutes in police power areas
should be constitutional because any grant of legislative authority
to act within the General Assembly's domain extends the inherent
power into new territory rather than limits it. The General Assembly's authorization of protective and restraining orders adds another weapon to the General Assembly's arsenal of police powers.
No one branch of government has the money, manpower, or resources to protect society. In police power areas, the General Assembly may enlist the indirect criminal contempt power of the
courts to protect society, and the courts should be willing to assist
the General Assembly in the exercise of police power. By the same
token, violations of court orders that protect the general public occur outside the presence of the court at all times of the day and
night. Therefore, courts must rely on the police and prosecutors to
bring violators before the court. Because the General Assembly is
extending the power of the courts, the legislature should have some
authority to fix the possible punishments, even if the contempt
power is restricted.
Indirect criminal contempt statutes in police power areas should
also be constitutional because they differ from the contempt statute
found unconstitutional in McMullen in purpose, which is to protect
society by authorizing the courts to issue protective and restraining
orders. The Investigating Grand Jury contempt statute protects by
preventing the premature disclosure of information that could
285.

Id. at 850.

286.

Id. at 854 (Castille, C.J., concurring).

287.

See supra text accompanying note 195.
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harm, the Crimes Code contempt statute protects by keeping defendants away from victims and witnesses, the PFAA and the Sexual Victim Protection contempt statutes protect by removing the
abuser from the abused, and the Vehicle Code contempt statute protects by removing unsafe vehicles from the highways.
In summary, the General Assembly and the courts can join forces
to protect society in police power areas, as "the constitutional construct [of the separation of powers principle] permits 'a degree of
288
interdependence and reciprocity between the various branches."'
In contrast, the general contempt statute found unconstitutional in
McMullen had no protective features and restricted the ability of
the courts to punish for contempt.
The only remaining task is to assess the constitutionality of current contempt statutes within the General Assembly's domain as
well as the remaining statutes that address a court's general contempt powers within Title 42.
A.

Judicial Code (Title 42) Contempt Statutes
1.

Section 4132

As mentioned above, section 4132 does not legislate contempt as
a substantive crime; it merely fixes the types of contempt that a
court may summarily punish. 28 9 Although section 4132 restricts a
court's summary contempt power and is procedural in nature, section 4132 should survive a constitutional challenge because the first
version of what is now section 4132 was enacted 159 years before
the adoption of article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 290 Moreover, it would be unreasonable and a violation of due

288. Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 991 (Pa. 2013)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 1977)).
289. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. It should not be overlooked that
courts view section 4132 as more substantive than procedural. Courts have interpreted section 4132 and its predecessor statute as legislating the substantive crime of contempt,
thereby allowing contemptuous acts to be punished under section 4132's and its predecessor
statute's subsections. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 721 A.2d 1072, 1073 (Pa. 1998) (section
4132); Commonwealth v. Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. 1997) (section 4132); Commonwealth
v. Stevenson, 393 A.2d 386, 389 (Pa. 1978) (Act of 1836); In re Johnson, 359 A.2d 739, 74142 (Pa. 1976) (Act of 1836). The substantive side of section 4132 does not raise a constitutional issue because the first version of what is now section 4132, the Act of 1809, was passed
199 years before Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2008), was decided; section
4132 provides notice of the general types of conduct that could be punished as contempt, and
the general classes of contempt give the courts great leeway in deciding what specific conduct
fits within each class. See Johnson, 359 A.2d at 741-42. As a backup, however, courts could
prosecute individuals under the court's inherent contempt power in addition to section 4132.
290.

See supra text accompanying notes 51-55, 165-68.
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process to allow a judge to impose summary punishment for contemptuous conduct outside the presence of the court. There is a
whole body of case law that requires notice, a hearing, and other
291
procedural protections for indirect criminal contempt.
Even if a court were to find section 4132 unconstitutional, there
would not be any significant effect because summary punishment
would continue to exist; the majority opinion in McMullen made
clear that summary punishment would continue to exist because it
is a right inherent in courts and incidental to the grant of judicial
292
power under article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
2.

Section 4133

As suggested by Justice Greenspan in her concurring opinion in
McMullen, section 4133 is likely unconstitutional because it limits
293
the power of the court to set an appropriate penalty for contempt.
Some acts of contempt committed outside the court could be so serious that limiting the punishment to a fine would be unreasonable.
Furthermore, if the contemnor receives notice, a hearing, and the
other procedural protections, there does not appear to be any reason
why the contemnor should not be subject to a term of imprisonment.
If the term is to exceed six months, other constitutional law requires
that the state give the contemnor a jury trial. 294 Additionally, the
contemnor has a right to an appeal, and the sentence is subject to
295
review on a clear abuse of discretion standard.

291. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text; see also Int'l Union, United Mine
Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 834 (1994) (finding that the procedural protections are necessary to protect due process rights of parties and prevent arbitrary exercise of
the contempt power); Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988) (observing that
penalties may not be imposed in criminal proceedings absent the protections afforded by the
Constitution); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1968) (holding that jury trial provisions of the Constitution apply to criminal contempt); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
537 (1925) (finding that prosecuting indirect criminal contempt requires contemnor to be
given notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, which includes the right to counsel
and the right to call witnesses); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444
(1911) (citing cases) (holding that in criminal contempt proceedings contemnor is presumed
to be innocent, must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to
testify against himself).
292. Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa. 2008).
293. Id. at 855 n.2 (Greenspan, J., concurring).
294. See supra note 195 and accompanying text; see also Commonwealth v. Falkenhan,
452 A.2d 750, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (citing Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 90
(Pa. 1974)).
295. See Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); see also McMullen, 961
A.2d at 854 (Castile, C.J., concurring) (explaining that orderly judicial function and compliance with court orders is ensured by giving trial courts free exercise of inherent contempt
power, subject to judicial review).
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Section 4134

Section 4134 is not unconstitutional because the statute only applies after a person is convicted and sentenced. Therefore, section
4134 is not a restriction on the court's inherent contempt power.
4.

Sections 4137-4139

Citing to McMullen, the Comment accompanying Rule 140 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure has already strongly
suggested that these statutes are an unconstitutional limitation on
the scope of the punishment for contempt. 296 The unconstitutional
subsections 2 97 in each statute "contain limitations upon the punishment that a minor court may impose for contempt. '2 98 The Comment notes that such statutory limitations were ruled unconstitutional in McMullen.299 A court might decide not to find sections
4137-4139 unconstitutional in their entirety, but instead may
choose to rule unconstitutional only the subsections that limit the
court's scope of punishment for contempt.
5.

Section 1523

Since section 1523 incorporates the contempt power and possible
punishments from section 4137 of Title 42,300 the analysis applicable to section 4137301 applies here.

296. Comment to PA. R. CRIM. P. 140; see supra text accompanying note 242.
297. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4137(c) (West 2004):
Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(1) or (3) may be a fine of not more
than $100 or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both. Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(2) shall be a fine of not more than $100. Failure to
pay within a reasonable time could result in imprisonment for not more than ten days.
Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(5) shall be in accordance with that
specified in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(b) (relating to contempt for violation of order or agreement). Punishment for contempt in subsection (a)(4) would be imprisonment for not
more than 90 days.
Id. §§ 4138(c), 4139(c):
Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(1) or (3) may be a fine of not more
than $100 or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both. Punishment for contempt specified in subsection (a)(2) shall be a fine of not more than $100. Failure to
pay within a reasonable time could result in imprisonment for not more than ten days.
298. Comment to PA. R. CRIM. P. 140.
299. Id.
300. See supra text accompanying note 84.
301. See supra Part V.A.4.
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Section 4549(b)

By enacting section 4549(b), the General Assembly legislated indirect criminal contempt but did not create a new form because a
violation of a secrecy order was indirect criminal contempt under
common law. Section 4549(b) is a legitimate exercise of the General
Assembly's police power. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already held that the investigating grand jury "serves identifiable
and legitimate state interests. ' 30 2 The statute does not create any
specific procedure for prosecuting indirect contempt violations and
therefore the contempt provisions of section 4549(b) do not violate
article V, section 10(c). There is no basis for finding this indirect
criminal contempt statute to be unconstitutional.
7.

Section 62A14

Since section 62A14 of Title 42, which relates to victims of sexual
30 3
violence or intimidation, and the PFAA have similar procedures
and identical punishments, 30 4 the analysis applicable to the
PFAA 30 5 applies here.
B.

Crimes Code (Title 18) Contempt Statute

Section 4955 does not legislate the crime of indirect criminal contempt because indirect criminal contempt is already a crime. 30 6 Section 4955 merely moves the crime of indirect criminal contempt into
Title 18, thereby expanding the inherent contempt power into an
area occupied by the General Assembly's police power.
Section 4955 does not contain any obvious limitations on how a
court may punish for the contempt. 30 7 Section 4955's procedural
requirement of prompt arraignment is not inconsistent with Rule
519(A)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 30 8 so
there is no issue under article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
302. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 277 A.2d 764, 774 (Pa.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000
(1971).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50, 253.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 156, 256.
305. See infra Part V.C.
306. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
307. Any double jeopardy issues that might arise when punishment is imposed for the
same conduct that violates one or more substantive crimes and the protective order is beyond
the scope of this article. But see generally Ryan J. Cassidy, United States v. Dixon: The
"Jeopardizing"of Judicial Contempt Power, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 179 (1995-1996).

308. "[W] hen a defendant has been arrested without a warrant in a court case, a complaint
shall be filed against the defendant and the defendant shall be afforded a preliminary arraignment by the proper issuing authority without unnecessary delay." PA. R. CRIM. P.
519(A)(1).
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Constitution. Under McMullen, sections 4954 and 4955 should
withstand constitutional challenge.
C.

ProtectionFrom Abuse Act (Title 23) Contempt Statute

The PFAA's contempt statute (section 6114) is similar to the statute held unconstitutional under McMullen. Unlike the general contempt statute in Title 42, the PFAA contempt statute is part of a
package of statutes to protect the public at large from domestic
abuse, which also falls under the General Assembly's police power.
Like the Crimes Code contempt statute, section 6114 also involves
a legislative grant of authority to the courts, as the PFAA "confers
upon courts the power to hold a defendant who violates a PFA order
in 'indirect criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accord30 9
ance with the [sic] law.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, through its Rules of Civil Procedure, gave approval to the PFAA's contempt statute.31 0 Subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Rule 1905 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that the Notices of Hearing and Order to the defendant shall be substantially in a form that contains essentially
the following language: "Violation of this order may subject you to
a charge of indirect criminal contempt which is punishable by a fine
of up to $1,000 and/or a jail sentence of up to six months in jail under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114. '311 The inclusion of section 6114 in the
Notices suggests that the pre-McMullen Court had no qualms with
the constitutionality of that statute. The 1997 Explanatory Comment after Rule 1905 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
explains that the forms are substantially based on those proposed
by members of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, indicating that the Notices were drafted after collaboration
with at least one organization interested in the cessation of abuse
31 2
of the plaintiff or minor children.
In addition, a comment to one of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to contempt proceedings before the minor judiciary, which
was amended after McMullen, states that the procedures to implement the minor judiciary contempt statutes "is not intended to supplant the procedures set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. [s]ections 6110 et seq.

309. Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (quoting 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(a) (West 2010)).
310. PA. R. CIV. P. 1905.
311. Id. 1905(a); see also id. 1905(c), (e).
312. See PA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.pcadv.org (last visited
Jan. 3, 2015).
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concerning violations of protection from abuse orders. 3 1 3 This is
another indication of judicial approval of section 6114.
Section 6114 is another instance in which the General Assembly
expanded the indirect contempt power rather than limited it. Section 6114's penalty provisions could be problematic under McMullen albeit the six-month term of incarceration is the maximum permissible without a jury trial.3 1 4 Any fine is limited to $1,000. The
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, provide advance notice to the defendant of the sentencing limits; 3 1 5 it might be unconstitutional for
a court to impose a greater sentence.
Section 6114's procedural requirement of prompt arraignment is
consistent with Rule 519(A)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the PFAA's requirement of a hearing within ten
days is less than the fourteen-day requirement under Rule of Criminal Procedure 540(G)(1) for a preliminary hearing when the defendant is in custody. There is no constitutional issue under article
V, section 10(c).
D.

Vehicle Code (Title 75) Contempt Statute

The Vehicle Code's contempt statute, section 4108, raises a concern because it pertains to an indirect criminal contempt proceeding for violation "of an injunction or restraining order," which is the
same language of the statute found unconstitutional in McMullen.
Nonetheless, section 4108 should be constitutional because safety
on the Commonwealth's highways falls within the General Assembly's police power. Once again, the General Assembly has expanded
the contempt powers of the courts into an area within the General
Assembly's domain.
Section 4108 does not set any penalty and thus does not limit a
court's ability to punish the contemnor. Section 4108 does not set
any procedure for determining a contempt violation. The Department of Transportation could file a petition for contempt with the
judge who issued the injunction or restraining order. This procedure would not violate article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution because it would not be inconsistent with existing
court rules.

313.
314.
315.

Comment to PA. R. CRIM. P. 140.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The separation of powers doctrine does not require perfect separation of duties between the three coequal branches of government,
and the branches may share some power. Historically, the General
Assembly has encroached on the inherent power of the courts by
legislating contempt, but has also expanded the contempt power of
the courts into police power areas. In McMullen, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the General Assembly cannot create a
form of indirect criminal contempt and restrict a court's ability to
punish individuals who commit contempt of court because indirect
criminal contempt is an offense against the court's inherent authority, not necessarily against the public. None of the justices' opinions
in McMullen restricts the General Assembly's power to authorize
courts to enter orders of protection, restraint, or injunction. A reasonable interpretation of McMullen is that the General Assembly
can continue to legislate indirect criminal contempt in police power
areas, as it does with all other crimes, as long as the purpose of the
statute is to protect society and the statute does not unduly restrict
the court's inherent power to punish. McMullen left unanswered
the extent to which the General Assembly can set the penalties for
indirect criminal contempt in police power areas.

